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The Militia Gunners
J.L. Granatstein

B

y general repute, two of the best
senior artillery officers in the
Canadian Army in the Second World
War were William Ziegler (1911-1999)
and Stanley Todd (1898-1996), both
products of the militia. Ziegler had
a dozen years of militia experience
before the war, was a captain, and was
in his third year studying engineering
at the University of Alberta when
his battery was mobilized in the
first days of the war. Todd had
attended the Royal Military College
in a war-shortened course, leaving
in 1916 for service with the Royal
Artillery. He served in Britain and
the Middle East and was invalided
out of the service after contracting
diphtheria. In business in Ottawa, he
joined the NPAM artillery and was
a lieutenant-colonel in 1939. Todd
became Commander, Royal Artillery
[CRA] in 3rd Canadian Division and
Commander, Corps Royal Artillery
[CCRA] in 2nd Canadian Corps.
Ziegler was CRA in 1st Canadian
Division. Both saw much action
and had high – and deserved –
reputations.
I interviewed Todd at his home
in Ancaster, Ontario in May 1991;
Ziegler in Edmonton in October of
the same year. The conversations
covered personalities and attitudes
and were sometimes brutally frank,
which pleased me and suited my
purposes as I did the research for The
Generals: The Canadian Army’s Senior
Commanders in the Second World War
(Toronto, 1993). As was my usual
practice, I made notes as we talked
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and then wrote up a memoranda
of each conversation, both of which
– with minor editing and some
deletions – follow. Copies of these
and all the interview memoranda
that I prepared are in my papers at
the York University Archives while
another set is held by the Directorate
of History and Heritage at National
Defence Headquarters, Ottawa.

Brigadier William S. Ziegler,
interviewed at Edmonton,
23 October 1991

B

orn in 1911, Ziegler had wanted
to attend RMC but couldn’t get
in. He joined the 61st Field Battery
of the Non-Permanent Active Militia
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in 1926 in Edmonton as a boy soldier,
got his commission in 193[2], and in
the summer of 1938 was attached
to the Permanent Force [PF] as an
instructor and captain. There he
mastered technical gunnery and
became an expert, well-positioned
to rise when the war started. He
went overseas in early 1940 with
the 8th Field Regiment and was sent
back to Canada to be brigade major
(Artillery) with the 3rd Canadian
Division. He attended Camberley
Staff College where he was told he
should try to stand first of the ten
Canadians there and not to worry
about the 190 others. He placed
second, Dan Spry [later a division
commander] beating him out. He
then became GSO1 Artillery at First
Canadian Army, commanding officer
of 13th Field Regiment, a colonel at
Canadian Military Headquarters,
and in February 1944 a brigadier and
Commander, Royal Artillery [CRA]
of 1st Canadian Division in Italy in
which post he stayed to the end of the
war. In 1946 he went to work for the
Allied Control Commission and was
governor of a province in northern
Germany for five years.
I asked about his impressions of
the PF. He was not overly impressed
by PF quality. There were princes
(Major-General H.O.N. Brownfield),
terrific soldiers (Major-General Chris
Vokes), and others who had to be
sacked. Still, when he was president
of a corporation he had to sack people
too. The army was a cross-section.
Bert Hoffmeister would have been
79
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Brigadier W.S. Ziegler, the acting commander of 1st Canadian Infantry Division, follows behind General Harry Crerar during an
inspection. The officers on the left are Majors P. Potvin and Y. Dubé of the Royal 22e Régiment, Utrecht, Netherlands, 10 July 1945.

a leader even if there had not been
a war. Guy Simonds was a man of
such quality as to be unusual in any
army – even when he first met him
at a Royal School in 1931-2 you knew
he wasn’t to be trifled with. So was
Bernard Montgomery, though he was
a little SOB. The PF’s problem was
slow promotion: at the end of the
war he was offered a regular army
commission as a brigadier but he
refused because he thought he could
look forward to one promotion only,
so he got out….
When he went overseas, his
regiment was billeted with the 11th
from Toronto (with Bruce Matthews
[later a division commander]). There
was initially no mixing between the
officers, and the westerners thought
the Toronto officers were snobs.
But after a large party where all got
80
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hammered together, their training
was comparable. He added that his
regiment had no guns initially (this
was before Dunkirk) so he devised
mock-ups out of timber and they
practised on those.
He had high regard for General
McNaughton and told a story of
training at Larkhill where they
were using a new artillery board for
plotting. He was leaning over a board
when he heard a voice from behind:
“What’s the trouble?” “I don’t know,
but if I ever get hold of the SOB that
designed this board….” It was, of
course, McNaughton, and it was his
board. McNaughton just laughed.
Still, Andy’s problem was that he
couldn’t deal with the Brits. He was
OK as a trainer, though perhaps he
had been weak in preparing senior
officers. After all, he was green

like all the Canadians. And, yes,
he was, while good technically,
weaker in higher command skills.
He wasn’t a presence and saw troops
infrequently.
Basil Price who commanded 3rd
Division was a grand old fellow,
lovable, a person you’d like as a
grandfather. It was hard for him to
bawl out anyone. These were not
compliments, said Ziegler. Price
was one of the “old dugouts” and it
wasn’t until the fighting began that
they disappeared. Still, there was no
option until 1942 or so, and the blame
is not the “dugouts” but Canada’s
for stripping its military after 1919.
He said the result would have been
chaos if McNaughton, Price, and [2nd
Division GOC Major-General Victor]
Odlum had had to lead the army into
action, though the sprinkling of good
2
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He thought it was natural for
Vokes to favour the PF. But even so,
under his veneer he was not a tough
guy. He was a real human being.
He wasn’t gunshy and he always
went forward, taking Ziegler along
in his jeep. Often they had to hide in
ditches together under fire. He was
a good planner, left Ziegler alone to
do his work and his Commander,
Royal Engineers too (which, as Vokes
was RCE must have been hard). He
could decentralize command. While
he was no brilliant tactician, he was
certainly adequate. Moreover, the
troops worshipped him. He recalled
one morning coming across some
Hasty Pees [Hastings and Prince
Edward Regiment] looking at dead
comrades. Vokes stopped the jeep.
“Don’t bloody look at them. Get out
your spades and bury the stiffs.”
They did. The soldiers had been
ready to vomit, but Vokes got
them moving and raised their
morale. He could also crack jokes
with troops, unlike Simonds. But
in the [1st Cdn Div] “A” Mess, it
was always “Sir” and “Ziegler”
or once in a while “Bill.”
He recalled that when
Vokes left as commander of the
Occupation Force in Germany,
he told Ziegler, staying with
the Allied Control Commission
in Lower Saxony that he could
have his alcohol. Ziegler expected
a case or two; instead a 3-ton
truckload arrived….
He had little regard for
Foulkes and no respect for him.
Ziegler’s heart bled for Vokes
when he didn’t get the 1 Cdn
Corps, and Vokes was livid. There
was no way he could serve under
Foulkes so he and [4th Cdn Armd
Div’s Major-General Harry]
Foster switched. If Ziegler could

have he would have left with Vokes.
Ziegler had known Foulkes since
1941 when, as a lieutenant-colonel
he had been on ship with Ziegler.
Even then he was unapproachable.
Was he able? A corps commander
in Italy had to leave most things to
division commanders, and at his first
major fight on the Lamone River the
Corps had a setback. Foulkes was
angry and sacked Brigadier [J.A.]
Calder [commanding 1st Brigade in
1st Cdn Div], making him, Ziegler
said, the scapegoat. That cemented
feeling against Foulkes in the Corps
and Ziegler never heard a good word
about him from anyone. He also
drank too much, once turning up
drunk to open a recreation club. He
thought [General Harry] Crerar had
a lot to do with Foulkes’ rise.

Library and Archives Canada PA 192738

staff officers under them might have
helped. If they’d been smart, they
would have left the fighting to their
GSO1s. They did their best but they
were no good.
When he arrived at 1st Cdn Div
as CRA, he thought the artillery was
stuck in the mud – literally. He knew
Bruce Matthews, his predecessor,
was a Simonds and Vokes favourite,
but it was inevitable that artillery
was suffering through a hard postOrtona winter dug into gun pits and
a bit slack on shaving, etc. He hauled
COs over the coals, ordered the guns
cleaned and, he says, restored morale.
Vokes initially was pretty
unhappy with him, thinking that
Ziegler’s new broom was a criticism
of Matthews. He had only met Vokes
briefly before, and Vokes hadn’t
wanted Matthews to leave. If he had
to go, Vokes had wanted Jack Ross,
a PF CO in 1st Cdn Div, to get the
job. Instead, as Brownfield, Brigadier
Royal Artillery of First Cdn Army,
made the appointment (and Ziegler
clearly was a Brownfield favourite),
he got the nod – and worse, came
from the UK. Moreover, Ziegler wore
glasses so, to Vokes, he couldn’t be
a soldier. He was in the doghouse
for a miserable period of weeks that
lasted until the Hitler Line attacks in
May 1944. Ziegler had had a month
to train his regiments and he drove
them hard. His artillery fire plan was
massive, double the El Alamein scale,
and he’d worked it out over a 72-hour
straight stretch. Then Vokes wanted
it changed in mid-battle and gruffly
said he supposed it couldn’t be done.
But with only a 3-hour pause Ziegler
switched direction. Vokes then called
Ziegler into his dugout and insisted
he have a full tumbler of whiskey.
“Goddammit, Ziegler, don’t you
understand English, a real drink.”
Ziegler passed out and later realized
that Vokes knew he was out on his
feet with fatigue. From that moment,
he worshipped Vokes and became to
Vokes “the best goddam CRA in the
Canadian Army.”

Brigadier Ziegler takes a salute
during a parade in Dordrecht,
Netherlands, 7 June 1945.
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Major-General Chris Vokes (left), the
commander of 1st Canadian Infantry
Division, was not happy when Ziegler was
appointed as his artillery commander.
Ziegler had three strikes against him:
Vokes had wanted a different PF man
for the job, he was militia, and he was
being posted from England. They were
able to work out their differences to the
point where Ziegler worshipped Vokes
and Vokes considered Ziegler “the best
goddam CRA in the Canadian Army.”

We then talked about Foster and
Hoffmeister. 1st Cdn Div suffered
under Foster. Not that he was evil:
he just wasn’t Vokes. Nothing he
did stuck in Ziegler’s memory. They
got on well, there were no problems,

and he handled his battles well. But
it wasn’t the same. Hoffmeister he
thought the most brilliant division
commander to emerge from the
NPAM. As good as any PFer, a
natural leader, a helluva soldier,
skillful, bold and well thought of
by his CRAs. Why? He knew the
capacity of the infantry and knew
how they could operate with the
other arms. He thought circumstance
had put him in position to show his
ability. If the Seaforths had not been
in 1st Cdn Div, if 1st Div hadn’t gone
to Sicily, etc., etc., Hoffmeister might
have remained untried….

Brigadier P.A.S. Todd,
interviewed at Ancaster, ON,
8 May 1991

T

he prewar Militia, Todd said, was
very tiny. His artillery regiment
in Ottawa had just enough for four
gun crews, but there was a lot of
education going on in the training
of officers and NCOs. He spoke
about the Militia Staff Course which
was an 8 month commitment of
evenings and a month off work in
the summer for full time. He spoke
too of meeting many of those who
became the wartime senior officers
at Petawawa….
We then talked about Harry
Crerar who Todd knew in Ottawa and
with whom he was then on first name
basis. He found him a well-trained,
slow, serious man who, he doubts,
ever laughed. He did a military
appreciation on everything he had
to think about, took his time and
came up with the right answers….He
was an excellent officer, 100 percent
sound and very real, but one problem
was that it took too long for people to
get to know him.

Library and Archives Canada PA 159551

Brigadier P.A.S. Todd (second from left), CCRA 2nd Canadian Corps, inspects captured German artillery at Meppen, Germany,
31 May 1945. Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, the commander of 2nd Canadian Corps sits in the passenger seat of the jeep.

82
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss1/8

4

: The Militia Gunners

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015

him intensely – snooty, snobbish,
etc. And this continued with the
war….He felt strongly enough
about this that when he and Bruce
Matthews were made brigadiers on
the same day he took 3rd Div CRA
and Matthews 1st Div just so Todd
wouldn’t have to work with him.
But he couldn’t avoid him in late
1944 when Simonds summoned him
to Corps HQ and announced that
Matthews was promoted to majorgeneral and Todd was the new
CCRA….He grew to admire him
enormously as a commander. He
and Brian Horrocks were the best. He
could be ruthless in getting where he
wanted to go; if something held him
up he’d sack people until someone
was there to do what he wanted.
The tactical ideas he produced were
almost certainly his own, the product
of long nights thinking in his caravan.
He went to sleep about 0100 and
was up at about 0600 to go off in his
armoured car. Simonds also was at
the start line for big attacks to make
sure things went well, and he was
not beyond pushing and pulling
the infantry to make sure they got
moving. But Todd said this caused
him problems, for Simonds wanted
his CCRA with him rather than at
HQ where all his communications
were….
Simonds almost never questioned
Todd’s artillery plans. He’d derive
his appreciation and make his plan
and then ask Todd to tell him how
the artillery could help achieve it.
He recalled an attack on Emmerich
where the River Rhine makes a sharp
turn west. Simonds had to attack
on a Friday and Todd had to soften
up the hill that was the heart of the
enemy position. He worked out a
system of dividing the hill into 100yd squares and then put one gun on
each square to fire four shells per
hour at irregular intervals. Simonds

questioned this and ordered a Victor
target – every gun in the Corps,
despite Todd’s protests. After a day,
Todd’s system went back on. The
attack went in without opposition,
the Germans putting up white flags.
Why? The continuous shelling had
stopped food, sleep, etc. Simonds
then apologized to Todd and after
that never altered his plans….
We talked about D-Day. Todd
had been preparing for this for 17
months as CRA 3rd Cdn Div. He had
to retrain his gunners on armoured
105s (scrapped after the invasion
when the Canadians went back to
25-pounders; Simonds then used
the “Priests” as armoured personnel
carriers), had to design the run in to
shore, and had to learn to fire from
the sea, difficult because guns need
aiming sticks, survey, etc. But he had
time….
Then we got into Rod Keller
[GOC 3rd Cdn Div]. He was a bluff,
hearty man, a bully, someone who
Library and Archives Canada PA 176878

Certainly Crerar fought with
Bernard Montgomery who greatly
favoured Guy Simonds….He got
Montgomery’s back up, like General
McNaughton, by trying to get into
Sicily which was Monty’s show.
When Crerar finally got into action,
Simonds was already there and
favoured. What this meant, he said,
was that Monty bypassed First
Canadian Army to give orders
directly to Simonds’ 2nd Canadian
Corps in Northwest Europe. He
recalled phone calls for Simonds that
were “yes sir, right away,” followed
by stalling and obfuscation when
Crerar tried to find out what was up.
The root of the Crerar-Simonds
problem was that they were both
artillery. Simonds from his 6’ 2”
looked down on Crerar as a stuffy
old man, while Crerar saw him as an
upstart to be put in his place. Crerar’s
stability led him to take a dim view
of Simonds….
He knew McNaughton socially in
Ottawa and had his sons in his Militia
unit. He also served on his staff as
BRA [Brigadier, Royal Artillery]
briefly. He was a good man in the
wrong place. For a start, training
under him was elementary….
McNaughton had been a good officer
in World War I but he doubted he’d
ever spent much time on tactics….
There was no question of his brains
or dedication, but he would do things
himself rather than sending his staff.
His weaknesses weren’t seen then,
however, and he was considered a
great man from whom great things
were expected. Todd was BRA
when Andy was sacked in 1943. He
remembered that the six brigadiers
[of First Canadian Army HQ] sat in
“A Mess” while Colonel Ralston [the
Minister of National Defence] was
doing the deed upstairs in a bedroom.
He had no doubt that Crerar made
a better Army commander than
McNaughton.
Simonds, of course, would have
been better yet. He knew him before
the war from Petawawa and disliked

Brigadier P.A.S. Todd
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would always say he didn’t care what
X or Y thought. He had a difficult
marriage, and he had a girlfriend in
London, married to a Royal Marines
officer. On occasion Todd had to
ensure that the officer, apparently
attached to the Canadians, was
assigned to weekend duty so Keller
had a free hand.
He was also yellow, [“Keller
was yeller”]. Foolish too. During
the D-Day planning, the planners
were housed in row houses near
Victoria Station [in London], under
tight security. Keller managed to get
out of the buildings, where all were
supposed to stay 24 hours, and to a
hotel…Within moments of reaching
the hotel, Keller was out in civvies.
Then on the Isle of Wight, Keller
and Todd lived with the Royal Navy
admiral who was to carry them in.
After a short period, the Admiral’s
#2 came to see Todd privately to say
they were disturbed by his general;
Todd said he could say nothing
without being disloyal and if the RN
was unhappy it should go through
channels. Then the three brigadiers
in the division – Cunningham,
Blackader, and Foster – came to see
him with their complaints, mainly
that Keller was never around and that
his GSO1, J.D. Mingay, was running
things. Again Keller gave then the
loyalty argument and, to me, used the
word mutiny. In fact, the complaints
were true. Mingay was a brilliant staff
officer who did run things; when he
had a problem, he and Todd (“Uncle
Stanley” – he was in his 40s and older
than almost everyone else) worked
them out. In effect, Mingay and
Todd ran the division, Keller signing
everything put in front of him.
Once ashore in France, the yellow
showed. His caravan was dug in
and he stayed in it. When he was
wounded in the USAAF bombing, he
whimpered and moaned from his two
small wounds. There was apparently
great relief for all when he was taken
away….Why did no one twig to this
earlier? He had a long conversation
84
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Todd had strong opinions about his commanders. He respected Crerar and Simonds,
thought McNaughton was a good man in the wrong place and considered Rod Keller,
commander of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, yellow, foolish and a bully. He believed that
Dan Spry, Keller’s replacement, was a good commander, but young and inexperienced.

about this with Simonds before his
death who said that when Brig.
Cunningham was sacked, he had
wanted to overturn it first because he
was an RMC classmate and second
because he had no confidence in
Keller’s judgment. Then why did he
not move against Keller? Again no
answer.
Spry succeeded Keller. He was
very young indeed but he was an
excellent GOC. Todd couldn’t judge
his tactical skills but he was a great
change from Keller and wasn’t
frightened….The next spring when

3rd Div put in a brigade attack,
Simonds was at the start line and
Spry wasn’t. The attack was a mess,
and Simonds went back to Spry’s
HQ where he and his CRA were
asleep, after an all-night poker game.
Simonds sacked him on the spot and
the CRA too….He attributed Spry’s
problem to inexperience. He was just
a kid…..
J.L. Granatstein is the author of the second
edition of Canada’s Army: Waging War and
Keeping the Peace (University of Toronto
Press, 2011).
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